Evolutionary games were …rst developed by biologists (e.g., Maynard Smith and Price 1973) and later adapted and extended by economists (see, e.g., Friedman 1991) . While classical game theory makes strong assumptions about the player's cognitive capacities, evolutionary game theory replaces rationality by natural selection. Speci…cally, rather than maximizing expected payo¤s, the players in evolutionary games are replicators who reproduce their kind. The well-known replicator dynamic equation (Taylor and Jonker 1978) predicts that the rate of growth in the distribution of population playing each strategy would be roughly proportional to the deviation of that strategy's payo¤ from the population's average payo¤.
There is, however, an important di¤erence between evolutionary dynamics and standard repeated games in the following sense. In evolutionary games, players are essentially programmed to follow some rule with no appeal to rationality. On the other hand, the distribution of strategies across a population can be interpreted as a sequence of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In the latter case, a necessary implication is that there should be no serial correlation or dependence in the distribution of strategies played in each period. In this note, I present evidence that the strength of evolutionary dynamics is inversely related to the degree of competition among players. This suggests that competition favors rational-choice game theory.
A relatively few papers tested mixed-strategy equilibrium play using nonexperimental data (Chiappori et al. 2002 and Palacios-Huerta 2003 using penalty kicks in soccer; Walker and Wooders 2001 and Hsu et al. 2007 using serve directions in tennis). The authors considered whether players switch from one direction to another too often or too infrequently to be random. One observation is that serial independence seems to hold more often for penalty kicks than for tennis matches. One possibility is that the kicker is under more pressure than a tennis player considering the nature of these two sports. Substantiating this conjecture would require a set of quasi-experiments across settings that only di¤er by the level of competition.
I argue that application statistics from a collegiate university (where governing authorities are divided between a number of constituent colleges) can provide a testing ground for the relation between competition and evolutionary dynamics, where payo¤s in the previous year can potentially a¤ect the current distribution of strategies. In the next Section, I explain why Cambridge University's admissions system generates a unique data set of quasi-experiments from a large high-stake game with adequate information environment. Section 3 estimates the replicator dynamic equation for each undergraduate subject o¤ered and show the main result that the coe¢ cient of the dynamic is inversely related to the applications-to-o¤ers ratio.
Data
In Cambridge, the Colleges are responsible for admitting students to the University's degree programs. Unlike applying to (multiple) universities, a prospective student can only apply to a single College in a given year. All applications, where interviewing process is an important factor, are handled by the Colleges. It is fair to say that applicants are highly motivated and decide carefully which College to apply. It seems reasonable to assume that applicants are randomly drawn from a single population, and they do not attempt to in ‡uence the future applicant's action. 1 The information environment is that the University started publishing application statistics on their website from the academic year 2004-05. In particular, application statistics were broken down for each subject by College (and for each College by subject). This means that the prospective students could see the number of applicants and o¤ers in the previous few years for all College and the subject that they were considering to study. 2 Similarly, one of the control variables, the College's ranking, was also published by the press and well-advertised nationally.
There are a couple of institutional details that need to be taken into account when de…ning the strategies and payo¤s. First, applicants can make an open application without specifying a College. 3 However, this option is not included in the strategy set because each open application is allocated to a College using a computer algorithm, and Colleges treat them in exactly the same manner as direct applications to the College. Accordingly, the University has not published statistics for open applications category, and we do not observe the payo¤s from this strategy. 4 Second, the Colleges jointly operate a pool system, where Colleges can make an o¤er to those who applied to other Colleges and were subsequently placed in the pool. That is, the system provides a second chance for those who were marginally rejected by their College of choice. The application statistics that are available on the University's website contained such disaggregated numbers for all categories (i.e., o¤ers, of which o¤ers through pool, and o¤ers through pool by another College), which allowed applicants to calculate the success rate from choosing any College.
There are 29 constituent Colleges that admit undergraduate students, which represent the strategy set of the players. Among these, three Colleges are only for women, and another four are exclusively for mature students (i.e., 21 years or older); however, this would not pose a problem unless these applicants behave very di¤erently from the general pool of the applicants. The data runs from academic year 2004 to 2009, and there are 24 subjects in the sample, which represent 24 quasi-experimental rounds. That is, the strength of replicator dynamic is assumed to di¤er across subjects. 
Estimation
The following exposition is standard in the literature. The set of strategies is S = f1; : : : ; ng, where i 2 S represents a College. A population state is x 2 X = fx 2 R 
where _ x is the time derivative andF i (x) = F i (x) F (x) denotes the excess payo¤ of strategy i relative to the population average.
The empirical counterpart can be speci…ed as
where t is the year dummy, c i is the College dummy, and " i;t is the error term. X i;t is a set of time-varying covariates, which include the annual College ranking and the total number of o¤ers made in year t, both of which are casually suspected to a¤ect the number of applications. 6 I estimate the above equation for each of 24 subjects using OLS and …xed-e¤ects speci…cations. The key parameter is , which measures the strength of evolutionary dynamics. Table 1 shows only the coe¢ cients from each estimation, where the four columns are selfexplanatory. Not surprisingly, the results give some support for the central prediction of evolutionary dynamics in the sense that the coe¢ cients are generally positive and sometimes statistically signi…cant. Fixed-e¤ects and the covariates separately do not seem to change the estimates signi…cantly; however, jointly they increase the estimates substantially.
In column (4), in 20 out of 24 subjects the coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signi…cant. 7 The question of interests is what explains this relatively large variation in the estimated coe¢ cients across subjects. As previously mentioned, the level of competition in each subject may explain the di¤erential strength of evolutionary dynamics. Therefore, I regress the estimated coe¢ cients on the (average) o¤ers-to-applications ratio for each subject. The results are shown in Table 2 along with scatterplots in Figure 1 . They show a clear, strong and robust relationship between the two variables with upward-sloping …tted lines. This means that the previous year's excess payo¤ is a weaker predictor for the applicants'choice of Colleges in the current year for subjects that have on average been more competitive than others.
This note empirically measures the strength of evolutionary dynamics in college applications and relates it to the degree of competition in each subject discipline. The evidence suggests a negative relationship between the two, which is in line with the general notion that competitive pressures tend to favor players'rational choice behavior rather than naive adaptive dynamics. That is, in terms of conventional game theory, the previous round's payo¤s tend to be a predictor for the choice of current strategy only when the ex ante payo¤s are generally high. One potentially avenue for future research is to examine the relationship between the strength of evolutionary dynamics and the level of competition across markets or industries. 
